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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In the third paragraph of this section of Appellee's Brief, it is asserted that the issue
substantively is "whether the court ruled correctly as a matter of law that Mr. Hansen was not an
at will employee". Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court undertook to rule on that
issue as a matter of fact and that this was error, as it was a question offeetfor the jury to decide,
hence this appeal.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Appellant cited on page 6 of his brief that the determinative law was Rule 56, U. C. R. P.,
hence Appellees assertion the Appellee (sic) identifies no controlling rules, regulations, statutes or
constitutional provisions is not so. (See Page 1 of Appellee's Brief)
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Substantially correct.

B.

Correct.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT

Correct
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Under this heading, Appellant's Brief on Page 8 argues that Plaintiff was never an "at
will" employee because of an express oral contract entered into in 1990, which set forth the length
of his employment (during physical and mental abilities).
ARGUMENT
On this subject, Appellee argues (See Page 2 of Appellee's Brief) as follows:
^(Appellant's) argument beginning on page 9 is to state the conclusion that summary judgement
was not appropriate, and then to recite at length quotationsfroma variety of cases stating the
standard of review for summary judgement". In the next paragraph of Appellee's Brief it refers to
page 14 of Appellant's Brief wherein Appellant argues that Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the
issue of whether or not he was an "at will employee". Thus, it is clear that the brief in question
3

not only supplied the argument on which it was based, but set forth the authorities in support
thereof, hence there has been no "dumping" here, such as was described in the case Crossroads
Plaza Association v. Pratt. 912 P 2nd, 961 (Utah 1996) (the term "dump" comes from Appellee's
brief, not from the Court opinion (See Addendum No. 1).
The next case dealt with in Appellee's Brief is Astil v. Clark. 956 P 2nd, 081 (Utah App.
1998). There, the Court would not consider application of a California jury instruction to that
case where "no analysis or legal authority" was presented to the Appellate Court (P. 1089). Said
case is clearly distinguishable from the instant one as no jury instruction "in case of remand" is
sought here, and none are presented here, as was the case there.
As for Butler. 909 P 2nd, 225, the next case cited by Appellee, requires a marshalling of
evidence by the Appellant in challenging the accuracy and sufficiency of evidence underlying the
trial court's findings of fact. Here, the trial court made no findings of fact, but only a conclusion
of law, to wit: that Appellant was an "at will employee". It is clear that Appellee so understood
the subject brief because in bold print on page 5 it states "B. Mr. Hansen was an At Will
Employee as a Matter of Law". The last sentence of the fourth paragraph of Appellee's Brief
(Page 6), thereunder states "In the language of Rule 56, the claims failed for a lack of any genuine
issue of material fact as to whether an "at will" relationship existed". The "claims failed" must
refer to Appellant's claim that he was entitled to a trial on any material fact in dispute, and
Appellee claims that there was none. However, that "begs the question", because the issue is
whether or not there is a material fact in dispute, and not whether there must be a trial if such a
factual dispute exists.
As for cases: A. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores Inc. 972 P 2nd 395 (Utah 1998), B. Fox v.
MCI Communications Corp. 931 P 2nd 857 (Utah 1997), and C. Sorensen v. Kennecott Utah
Copper Corp. 873 P 2nd 1311 (Utah 1991), (See Table of Authorities in Appellee's Brief),
Appellant acknowledges (as those cases so held) that it is his burden to prove that an "at will"
contract did not exist, but contends he is entitled to prove such at trial, and that the existence of
such a relationship can not be decided as a matter of law in the face of his affidavit that there was
an express oral contract entered into in 1990 that would endure as long as he was healthy enough
to fullfill his duties under that contract.

CONCLUSION
There are questions of fact as to whether the Appellant was an "at will" employee and
whether Appellee was entitled to Summary Judgement as a mater of law. Thus, Summary
Judgement was not proper. It should be over-ruled and the case remanded to the trial court for
trial and disposition.

4

Dated this

day of May, 1999.

Robert B. Hansen, Pro Se
Appellant

ADDENDUM
Copy of opinion in the case of Crossroads Plaza Association v. Pratt, 912 P 2nd,
961 (Utah 1996).
Summary of Arguments and Detail of Arguments, Pages 8-14 of Appellant's
Brief.
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CROSSROADS PLAZA ASS'N v. PRATT
Cite as 912 PJtd 961 (Utah 1996)

ftback. Applying Utah Code Ann. §§ 59[4] However, effective July 1, 1995, the
Sl02 to -103, the Court of Appeals af- Legislature amended provisions of the tax
]aed the Commission's declaratory order code to specifically address the issue of
bthe proposed transaction would be sub- whether sale-leaseback transactions were
^Ito Utah sales tax. Matrix Funding subject to the sales tax. See Utah Code Ann.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 868 P.2d § 59-12-102(13)(c) (Supp.1995). This provi^833-34 (Utah CtApp.1994). We granted sion applies to the type of sale-leaseback
Uorari to review that decision. However, transaction at issue in this case. Neither the
ause of an amendment to the tax code in Tax Commission, nor the Court of Appeals in
; dealing specifically with the taxability of reviewing the decision of the Tax Commis-leaseback transactions, we hold that this sion, addressed the issue in light of the 1995
»is moot.
amendment because it had not yet been enfiacted. A decision by this Court addressing
ll, 2] As a matter of sound jurispruden- the hypothetical transaction presented to the
policy, courts refrain from adjudicating Commission on the basis of the pre-1995 law
issues when the underlying case is could not decide the taxability of a future
"A case is deemed moot when the sale-leaseback transaction between Matrix
uested judicial relief cannot affect the and its customers. Thus, a decision by this
fcts of the litigants." Burkett v. Schwendi- Court could not affect any legal rights or
773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989); see also duties of the parties and in a literal sense
Schumvdiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 would be a meaningless judicial act. For
,1986); Black v. Alpha Fin Corp., 656 that reason, we hold that the case is moot.
;409, 410-11 (Utah 1982); Wh Street See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44
"' w. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998 n. (Utah 1989).
t CtApp.1993).
atrix requested a declaratory order from
[Tax Commission based on a proposed
L to enter into a sale-leaseback arrangewith an unspecified customer. The
purpose of the arrangement was to
security for a loan from Matrix. In
tigs before the Commission and
> the Court of Appeals, the parties stipthat the issue related to a purely
ve arrangement. That status was
in the briefs and at oral argument
Sfthis Court.

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., and BEN H. HADFIELD,
District Judge, concur.
RUSSON, J., having disqualified himself,
does not participate herein; BEN H.
HADFIELD, District Judge, sat.
E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
» ^ ^ » " ^ ^ ^ i

^

CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATION, a
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

kThe hypothetical posture of a case
»by itself, prevent usfromreviewing
strative declaratory order. Pursuv.
he Utah Administrative Procedures
*] declaratory order has the same Gary PRATT, in his official capacity only,
and Salt Lake County, Defendants, Apttd binding effect as any other order
pellants, and Cross-Appellees.
1
an adjudicative proceeding." Utah
§ 63-46b-21(6)(d). For example,
No. 940454.
^Street GaUeria, 860 P.2d at 998 n. 4,
Supreme Court of Utah.
' of Appeals reviewed a ruling of the
ssion even though no tax was
Feb. 22, 1996.
^because the question of whether tax
?ould be incurred for similar activi!
future constituted a genuine conCorporate taxpayer sought declaratory
L^ject to adjudication.
and injunctive relief from real property taxes
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imposed by county on leasehold improvements made to taxpayer's real property by
lease of that property. The District Court,
Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J.,
granted taxpayer summary judgment, and
county appealed. The Supreme Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) rule that leasehold
improvements under control of lessee shall
be taxed as personal property of lessee made
owners of underlying real property ultimately responsible for taxes on such improvements; (2) "leasehold improvements" were
real property for real property tax purposes;
and (3) property was "improvement" to real
property if it was erected upon or affixed to
land.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error <3=*842(1)
Because challenge to summary judgment
presents for review only questions of law,
reviewing court accords no deference to trial
court's conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
2. Administrative
<3>390.1

Law

and

Procedure

It is longstanding principle of administrative law that agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes.
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>390.1
Administrative rule out of harmony or in
conflict with express provisions of statute
would in effect amend that statute.
4. Taxation @=»65
Tax commission rule that leasehold improvements under control of lessee shall be
taxed as personal property of lessee did not
transform improvements into personal property, such that they could only be taxed to
lessee, but rather, consistent with enabling
statutes, made improvements taxable in way
or manner in which personal property was
taxed, and therefore owners of underlying
real property were ultimately liable for taxes
due on such improvements. U.C.A.1953, 592-303, 59-2-1326; Utah Admin. Code R88424P-32(B).

5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>412.1
Rules made in exercise of power delegated by statute should be construed together with statute to make, if possible, effectual
piece of legislation in harmony with common
sense and sound reason.
6. Statutes @=»188
In interpreting statutes, courts look to
plain meaning of language at issue to discern
legislative intent.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure
<3=>390.1
Agency rule cannot trump statutory provision.
8. Taxation @=>65
"Leasehold improvements" were real
property for real property tax purposes, so
as to make applicable statute which provided
that tax due upon improvements upon real
property assessed to person other than owner of real property was lien upon property
and improvements. U.CA1953, 59-2-1325;
U.CJU953, 59-2-102(11) (1994).
9. Taxation <3=>65
Test of whether property is "improvement" to real property for real property tax
purposes is whether it is erected upon or
affixed to the land, rather than test used in
mechanic's lien cases. U.C.A.1953, 59-2102(11) (1994).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

10. Taxation <&=>65
If real property underlying improvement
is building or other improvement, this satisfies statutory requirement that property constituting improvement be affixed "to the
land" for purposes of real property taxation.
U.CJU953, 59-2-102(11) (1994).
11. Appeal and Error <&=>756
Reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authorityJ
cited and is not simply depository in whicKi
party may dump burden of argument andj
research.

CROSSROADS PLAZA ASS'N v. PRATT
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12. Taxation <S=>493.5
Taxpayer's failure to present any evidence that county failed to give timely notice
of property tax on leasehold improvements
rendered issue inappropriate for review.
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake
County; Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge.
Robert B. Lochhead, David F. Crabtree,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Douglas R. Short, Mary Ellen Sloan, Salt
Lake City, for defendants.
RUSSON, Justice:
Crossroads Plaza Association (Crossroads)
filed an action against Gary Pratt, the Salt
Lake County Treasurer, and Salt Lake
County, seeking a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief regarding taxes imposed by
Salt Lake County on leasehold improvements
to Crossroads' real property. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of
Crossroads. Salt Lake County appeals. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS
In 1987, Chappell, Inc., a Utah corporation
dba Bennetton, leased space in the Crossroads Plaza Mall to establish a retail clothing
store. Bennetton made changes to the property including the installation of various
walls, a ceiling, a glass storefront, carpet,
and granite flooring. In June 1988, the Salt
Lake County Assessor's office conducted an
audit of Bennetton's property, categorizing it
as trade fixtures, computer equipment, and
leasehold improvements. Subsequently, the
Salt Lake County Assessor submitted to
Bennetton a document setting forth the
leasehold improvements, including the walls,
storefront, flooring and ceiling, and instructing Bennetton to indicate the year in which
they were installed and the cost of installing
the improvements. On the basis of Bennetton's answers, the assessor determined the
taxable value of the leasehold improvements.
*• The affidavit is authorized by section 59-2306(1) of the Utah Code, which provides in relevant part, "The county assessor may request a
signed statement in affidavit form from any per-

Each year from 1988 to 1990, Bennetton
filed a personal property affidavit* identifying not only its personal property, but also
its leasehold improvements, and paid taxes
on both to Salt Lake County (the County).
The County collected taxes on the leasehold
improvements from Bennetton through its
personal property tax collection system pursuant to an administrative rule of the tax
commission which provides, "A. Leasehold
improvements under the control of the lessee
shall be taxed as personal property of the
lessee." Utah Admin.Code R884-24P-32.
In 1991, Bennetton failed to file its personal property affidavit. The County notified
Bennetton of the delinquency and assessed
taxes against Bennetton based on the previously submitted affidavits. When Bennetton
failed to pay any of its 1991 property tax, the
assessor held a sale of Bennetton's personal
property to recover the taxes due on the
personal property pursuant to section 59-21310(1) of the Utah Code, which provides,
"The [county] treasurer shall collect the taxes delinquent on personal property . . . by
seizure and sale of any personal property
owned by the delinquent taxpayer." The
record indicates that the County did not intend to sell any of Bennetton's leasehold
improvement property. After the sale of the
personal property, the county assessor
served notice of the amount of tax due on the
leasehold improvements to Crossroads, the
owner of the underlying realty. Crossroads
filed a written objection with the County,
arguing that the tax notice was an impermissible double taxation and objecting to the
County's purported authority for assessing
the disputed tax to Crossroads. Without
responding to Crossroads' objection, the
County subsequently included the disputed
tax on the leasehold improvements in Crossroads' 1992 real property tax notice and
placed a lien on Crossroads' real property for
the tax due pursuant to section 59-2-1325 of
the Utah Code, which states:
A tax upon real property is a lien against
the property assessed. A tax due upon
son setting forth all the real and personal property assessable by the assessor which is owned,
possessed, managed, or under the control of the
person
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improvements upon real property assessed
to a person other than the owner of the
real property is a lien upon the property
and improvements. These liens attach as
of January 1 of each year.
(Emphasis added.)
In 1992, Crossroads paid the disputed tax
under protest and subsequently filed suit
against the County, claiming that (1) the
County's demanding payment of the taxes
due on Bennetton's leasehold improvements
was a double assessment of property in violation of Utah law; (2) the collection of the
disputed tax from a party unrelated to Bennetton, to whom the tax was originally assessed, was a violation of Utah law; and (3)
the levy, assessment, and collection of the
disputed tax from Crossroads or as part of
Crossroads' real property tax assessment
was a violation of Utah law. The County
responded, claiming that Crossroads, as the
owner of the underlying property, is responsible for the taxes due on the leasehold improvements of its tenants pursuant to section
59-2-1325 of the Utah Code. Both parties
moved for summary judgment.
In its motion, Crossroads primarily argued
that because the leasehold improvements had
been taxed as personal property under tax
commission rule 884-24P-32, Crossroads was
not liable for the tax. During the summary
judgment hearing, Crossroads stated: "And
so we have the issue well before us. The
argument that decides the entire case is
based entirely on statutory language and on
the rule promulgated by the Tax Commission." The court granted summary judgment in favor of Crossroads, concluding that
because the leasehold improvements were in
the control of the lessee, rule 884-24P-32,
which provides that leasehold improvements
be taxed as personal property, applied. The
court concluded that section 59-2-1325 did
not apply. On appeal, the County argues
that the court erred in finding (1) that rule
884-24P-32 was the governing law, and (2)
that leasehold improvements are personal
property and therefore taxable only to the
leaseholder, not to the owner of the underlying realty.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate
only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c); World Peace Movement of
Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d
253, 256 (Utah 1994). "Because a challenge
to summary judgment presents for review
only questions of law, we accord no deference
to the.trial court's conclusions but review
them for correctness." Id,; see Schurtz v.
BMW ofN. Am, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 111112 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS
We begin by addressing the apparent discrepancy between tax commission rule 88424P-32 and section 59-2-1325 of the Utah
Code. As did the trial court, we assume for
the sake of this part of the analysis that the
property in question was "leasehold improvements." Crossroads argues that under rule
884-24P-32, "leasehold improvements" are
specifically taxed as personal property which
are in the control of Bennetton and for which
Crossroads is not responsible. That rule
states:
A. Leasehold improvements under the
control of the lessee shall be taxed as
personal property of the lessee.
B. If not taxed as personal property of
the lessee, the value of leasehold improvements shall be included in the value of the
real property.
(Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the County argues that
rule 884-24P-32 only describes the method
by which leasehold improvements" should
be taxed, without establishing that "leasehold
improvements" are personal property and
that the tax on leasehold improvements is
actually controlled by section 59-2-1325 of
the Utah Code, which states:
A tax upon real property is a lien against
the property assessed. A tax due upon
improvements upon real property assessed
to a person other than the owner of the
real property is a lien upon the property
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and improvements. These liens attach as
of January 1 of each year.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court held that rule 884-24P-32
applied in this case and that section 59-21325 did not apply. The trial court concluded: "In light of the Court's finding that the
leasehold improvements were in the control
of the lessee, [rule 884-24P-32] . . . applies
in this case
Section 59-2-1325 of the
Utah Code is not a fall-back to the Rule
promulgated by the Tax Commission
"
The trial court determined that these provisions could not be harmonized and chose to
apply the rule over the statute.
[2,3] "It is a longstanding principle of
administrative law that an agency's rules
must be consistent with its governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div.,
846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993). Further,
"[a]n administrative rule out of harmony or
in conflict with the express provisions of a
statute *would in effect amend that statute/ "
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 532 (Utah
1994) (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax
Comm% 12; Utah 2d 42, 45, 361 P.2d 1112,
1113 (1961JX With these principles in mind,
we begin our analysis of these provisions.
[4-6] We first address the County's argument that rule 884-24P-32 can be read consistently with the tax code and that the trial
court erred in finding rule 884-24P-32 to be
the only governing law. " 'Rules made in the
exercise of a power delegated by statute
should be construed together with the statute
to make, if possible, an effectual piece of
legislation in harmony with common sense
and sound reason.'" Id. at 527 n. 22 (quoting McKnight v. State Land Bd, 14 Utah 2d
238, 245, 381 P.2d 726, 731 (1963)). Tax
commission rule 884-24P-32 was promulgated pursuant to section 59-2-303 of the Utah
Code, which sets out the general duties of
the county assessor. This section states:
Prior to May 22 of each year, the county
assessor shall ascertain the names of the
owners of all property which is subject to
taxation by the county, and shall assess the
property to the owner, claimant of record,

or occupant in possession or control [of the
property].
(Emphasis added.) "In interpreting this
statute, we look to the plain meaning of the
language at issue to discern the legislative
intent." Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm% 791 P.2d 511, 514
(Utah 1990). This section specifically allows
the assessor to assess property to one in
control of the property. Rule 884-24P-32,
which provides that leasehold improvements
under the control of the lessee be taxed as
personal property of the lessee is consistent
with this statute. See also Valley Fair Fashions, Inc. v. Valley Fair, 54 CaLRptr. 306,
307, 245 CalApp.2d 614 (Dist.CtApp.1966)
(holding that statute similar to section 59-2303 authorized assessment of improvements
to the tenant in control of the improvements).
The very statute Crossroads seeks to avoid
provides, "A tax due upon improvements
upon real property assessed to a person other
than the owner of the real property is a lien
upon the property and improvements."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1325 (emphasis added). It is obvious from the plain language of
this section that the legislature contemplated
that a tax on improvements might be assessed to someone other than the owner of
the underlying property.
Read consistently with the governing statutes, rule 884-24P-32 does not transform
improvements into personal property, but
rather in light of sections 59-2-303 and 59-21325, the rule provides a means of assessing
such improvements "to a person other than
the owner of the real property." Thus,
leasehold improvements taxed "as " personal
property means that such improvements will
be taxed "in the way or manner" in which
personal property is taxed. Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (1984) (emphasis added). Moreover, the second part of
the rule at issue provides, "(B) If not taxed
as personal property of the lessee, the value
of leasehold improvements shall be included
in the value of the real property." Utah
Admin.Code R884-24P-32(B) (emphasis added). Because this part of the rule refers to
leasehold improvements in the context of real
property valuation, it further indicates that
the first part of the rule at issue here merely
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provides for leasehold improvements to be
taxed in the way in which personal property
is taxed and can be read consistently with
section 1325.2
[7] Tax commission rule 884-24P-32 does
not contravene the requirement of section
59-2-1325 of the Utah Code that "a tax due
upon improvements upon real property . . . is
a lien upon the property." To the extent the
trial court found that rule 884-24P-32 controlled the dispute, it erred. An "agency
rule cannot 'trump' a [statutory provision]."
Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d at 532
(Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). Other jurisdictions have also held that a tax due
on improvements to real property is a lien on
that property regardless of whether the local
assessor may assess the tax to the lessee in
control of the improvements. For example,
in Koester v. Hunterdon County Board of
Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 399 A.2d 656 (1979),
the court stated: "In Becker the local assessor had for years assessed the value of the
building to its owner and the value of the
leased land on which it stood to its owner.
The Court of Errors and Appeals held that
notwithstanding this practice, the landowner
remained liable for the tax on the entire
parcel including the building
" Id. at 662
(citing Becker v. Mayor of Little Ferry, 19
A.2d 657, 659 (N.J.1941)). The court in
Koester went on to hold that separately taxed
mobile homes on leased property remained
taxable as real property. Id. at 663.
[8] To determine whether section 59-21325 applies to Bennetton's leasehold improvements, we must determine whether
"leasehold improvements" are improvements
to real property for tax purposes. Although
the tax code does not define "leasehold improvements," it does define "improvements,"
which are included in the code's definition of
"real estate or property."3 Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-2-102(20). "Improvements" include
"all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences,
and improvements erected upon or affixed to
2.

Crossroads argues that this court does not have
jurisdiction to invalidate the tax commission rule
because to maintain a judicial challenge to an
administrative rule, an aggrieved person must
exhaust all administrative remedies under the
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, which,
Crossroads argues, the County has not done.

the land, whether the title has been acquired
to the land or notv Utah Code Ann. § 592-102(11) (1992) (emphasis added). It is
clear from this wording that the legislature
contemplated that improvements might be
made to property in which types of interest
other than title may be held. We must
assume that since the legislature did not
specifically exclude "leased property" from
those nontitle lands, improvements to leased
property are included in this definition. Accord Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 743 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah
1987) (implicitly holding that structures in
question were "improvements" even though
affixed to leased real property); Great Salt
Lake Minerals & Chems. Corp. v. State Tax
Comm% 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1977)
(same); see also Utah State Tax Commission,
Property Tax Division, Personal Property
Tax Standards 2 (1992) (defining "leasehold
improvements" to mean ^improvements or
additions to leased real property that have
been made by the lessee (tenant)" (emphasis
added)).
Because "leasehold improvements" are
"improvements" and "improvements" are
real property, "leasehold improvements" are
real property for tax purposes. Thus, we
conclude that section 59-2-1325 applies to
leasehold improvements. "A contrary conclusion strains the express language contained [in the statute] and thwarts the imposition of taxes." Great Salt Lake Minerals
& Chems. Corp., 573 P.2d at 340. Under
Utah law, when a tax on leasehold improvements is due, section 59-2-1325 of the tax
code specifies that a lien is placed on the
underlying real property. We therefore reverse the trial court's conclusion that section
59-2-1325 does not apply to Bennetton's
leasehold improvements.
[9] However, because the trial court assumed that the property in question was
"leasehold improvements" and then erroneInasmuch as we find the administrative rule on
leasehold improvements to be consistent with the
Tax Code, we do not address this issue.
3.

We construe this definition as applying to "real
estate" or "real property."
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ously concluded that rule 884-24P-32 establishes that "leasehold improvements" are
personal property, it did not reach the parties' arguments as to whether the property in
question would otherwise qualify as "improvements" to real property. Thus, we now
address the parties' legal arguments as to
what constitutes an "improvement" to real
property to guide the trial court's disposition
of this issue on remand.
As it did in its motion below, the County
argues on appeal that the property in question was "improvements to real property" by
virtue of its being affixed to the underlying
property. The County argues that under
Utah law, "affixation" is the sole test of
whether a structure is an improvement to
real property for tax purposes. Crossroads
argues, however, that the property in question was not "improvements" because it was
not permanently affixed and it did not materially enhance the value of Crossroads' property.
Crossroads argues that to be "improvements to real property," structures must
meet the test set forth in a mechanic's lien
case, Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley
Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982).
Mueller involved a former Utah statute under which unpaid contractors could enforce a
mechanic's lien upon the real property which
was improved by their work. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 3&-1-3, 38-1-^ (1953). The statute
applied only to buildings, structures, or improvements to property and did not include
the installation of equipment or personal
property. Id. To distinguish between real
and personal property, the court used a
three-part test, considering
"(1) [the] manner in which the item is
attached or annexed to realty; (2) whether
the item is adaptable to the particular use
of the realty; and (3) the intention of the
annexor to make an item a permanent part
of the realty."
Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1283 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 155, 427 P.2d 749, 751
(1967)). Mueller affirmed the trial court's
finding that under the three-part test, the
equipment in question was personal property, not improvements to real property. Id.

at 1283-85. While this court may have endorsed this test for purposes of a mechanic's
lien, more recently, in Morton International,
Inc. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax
Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 594 (Utah 1991),
we rejected this type of functional analysis to
determine whether property is real property
for taxation purposes. We noted that "the
case law from other jurisdictions is at best
conflicting in this area. There are jurisdictions that have not followed a functional approach in interpreting similar statutes. Furthermore, the jurisdictions that have adopted
a functional approach have reached conflicting conclusions." Id (footnotes omitted). In
Morton International, this court upheld as
reasonable a tax commission determination
that flooring, walls, and ceiling were real
property for tax purposes, not equipment
exempt from sales and use taxes. We reasoned that given the inconsistencies between
the controlling statute and governing rule
and the conflicting case law, the Commission's determination was not to be disturbed.
Id.
As in Morton International, we decline to
adopt the test urged by Crossroads. We
find guidance instead in our past interpretations of the tax code. "Improvements" include "all buildings, structures, fixtures,
fences and improvements erected upon or
affixed to the land, whether the title has
been acquired to the land or not." Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992) (emphasis
added). In Nickerson Pump & Machinery
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 30,
33, 361 P.2d 520, 521-22 (1961), construing a
former sales and use tax statute, we held
that water pumps, although installed, did not
become real property for tax purposes. We
reasoned that the placement was "incidental"
to the purpose of the water pumps and a
"mere convenience for the purchaser because
of the great weight of the pumps," and we
compared the pumps to "a massive desk or
refrigerator built to specifications." Id.
More recently, however, in Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d
303 (Utah 1992), we recognized there may be
factual disputes as to the distinction between
tangible personal property and real property
and found reasonable a tax commission rul-
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ing that certain items were real property
"once attached " to the property. Id. at 307
(emphasis added). Similarly, in another tax
case, we reiterated that a Utah sales tax
statute identical to the property tax statute
at issue in this case defines 'improvements"
as "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences
and improvements erected upon or affixed to
land
" Great Salt Lake Minerals &
Chems. Corp., 573 P.2d at 339 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 59-3-1(3) (emphasis added);
see also Valgardson Hous. Sys. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 849 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah CtApp.),
cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) ("Language in Utah tax cases supports the . . .
'affixation* distinction between tangible personal property and improvement to real estate."). In light of the plain language of the
statute and our recent decisions regarding
"improvements," we now hold that the test of
whether property is an "improvement" to
real property for tax purposes is whether it
is "erected upon or affixed to the land."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992).

held that simply adding value to property
does not make a change to real property an
improvement. See Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah
2d 364, 367, 294 P.2d 703, 705 (1956). Likewise, an improvement does not fail to qualify
as an improvement under the statute merely
because it fails to add value to the property.
With respect to Crossroads' "permanency"
argument, we note that even jurisdictions
which, by statute, require that improvements
be "permanently affixed" do not equate permanence with perpetuity. See Michigan
Nat'l Bank v. City of Lansing, 96 MichApp.
551, 293 N.W.2d 626, 627 (1980) ("It is sufficient if the item is intended to remain where
affixed until worn out, until the purpose to
which the realty is devoted is accomplished
or until the item is superseded by another
item more suitable for the purpose."), ajfd,
322 N.W.2d 173 (Mich.1982); San Diego
Trust & Sav. Bank v. San Diego County, 16
Cal.2d 142, 105 P.2d 94, 98 (1940), cert denied, 312 U.S. 679, 61 S.Ct. 449, 85 L.Ed.
1118 (1941) (same).

[10] Further, we recognize that while
"land" is not defined in the tax code, the
common meaning of the word frequently includes both land and the structures built
upon it. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-82(l)(e) (defining "land" for purposes of certain construction agreements to mean "any
real property, including any building, fixture, improvement"); Jeffery v. City of Salinas, 232 Cal.App.2d 29, 42 CaLRptr. 486,
498-99 (1965) ("land" includes land and improvements). Thus, as in this case, if the
underlying property is a building or other
"improvement," this satisfies the statutory
requirement that the property be affixed "to
the land."

Whether property constitutes "improvements" to real property for tax purposes
depends on whether such property is "erectr
ed upon or affixed to" the underlying property. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) (1992).
In this case, because the trial court found
that the property in question was personal
property as a matter of law, it did not reach
the question of whether the property in question was in fact "improvements" to real property. On remand, we direct the trial court to
determine whether the property in question
constitutes "improvements" under the "affixation" test we have enunciated.
CONCLUSION

Crossroads asserts that the property in
question was not "permanently" attached and
that in any event it did not add value to the
Crossroads property. However, the statute
merely requires that the structure be "erected upon or affixed to the land" and requires
neither permanency nor that the improvement materially enhance the value of the
underlying property. We have previously

[11,12] Under Utah law, leasehold improvements are improvements to real property for tax purposes. While taxes on
leasehold improvements may be assessedy
and collected from the lessee in control ofsuch improvements, owners of the unden3&|
ing real property are ultimately responsibtel
for taxes due on such improvements undgl
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section 5&-2-1325 of the Utah Code.4 In the
instant case, Crossroads, as the owner of the
property underlying Bennetton's leasehold
improvements, is responsible for unpaid taxes on such improvements.5 The trial court's
legal conclusion that the taxes on leasehold
improvements under Bennetton's control are
collectable only from Bennetton is in error,
and therefore, we reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of
Crossroads and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.°

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART,
Associate C.J., HOWE and DAVIS, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself,
does not participate herein; LYNN W.
DAVIS, District Judge, sat.
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4.

We recognize that this rule as applied to mall
owners may seem somewhat harsh given their
particular circumstances with respect to leasehold improvements on their property. However,
a change in the statutory provision underlying
our decision today is a question properly within
the province of the legislature.*

5.

We do not address whether the County's action
in this case amounts to a double assessment of
taxes. Although Crossroads raises this issue, its
briefing is inadequate. "[A] 'reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the . . . party may dump the
burden of argument and research.'" Butler,
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Co. v. Pinecrest Pipeline

Petition for formal probate of will was
filed following death of spouse while divorce
proceedings were pending, and surviving
spouse filed actions challenging validity of
change of life insurance beneficiary, severance of joint tenancy ownership of marital
residence, and creation of revokable trust
agreement. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Leslie A. Lewis, J., granted
survivor's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that removal of household furnishing was conversion, but, following trial,
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (1995) (quoting State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)). For
the same reason, we do not address whether due
process problems exist in Crossroads' case.
We likewise do not address whether the County's failure to give timely notice of the tax on the
leasehold improvements invalidates any lien that
would otherwise arise on Crossroads' property.
We find no evidence in the record that Crossroads raised this issue before the trial court, and
we will not consider it on appeal. Kennecott
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352
(Utah 1993); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave.
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993).
6.

Because we reverse and remand, we do not
reach Crossroads' cross-appeals regarding the
calculation of interest and fees.

On the second issue for review, to wit "whether Life Line is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law" the record does not show
that it is.

In fact, Life Line's Memorandum shows (Record 42,

Par. 9) that durincj 1997 Appellant was on sick leave, and
Appellant's verified complaint (Record 05, Par. 3) shows an
express oral contract for an indefinite period of time but
terminable if Appellant's health rendered him unable to fulfill
his contract.

In £hort, even if the subject employment was "at

will" the employment contract continued until terminated and
there is no evidence in the record that it was ever terminated.
In nearly every summary judgment opinion where such a motion
was granted the_re is a coupling of a determination of no factual
issues with a finding that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

As noted above, no such coupling

exists here for reasons stated above.
8.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant respectfully argues that he was never an "at will"

employee as the duration of his employment contract was expressly
dependent upon his health and he was never terminated due to
physical or mental inability to perform the work he contracted to
do.

Appellee contends otherwise and this creates the questions

of fact which preclude summary judgment.
9.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENTS
There was no written agreement which could have conclusively

settled the "at will11 question, but the oral agreement of the

8

parties set forth its duration (until Appellant was unable to
carry out his duties) and thus the employer was not able
"a t ¥ :i ] II " b 3 end the employment contract before its termination
date and to do so for any reasons of its choosing.
This factual dispute precluded summary judgment against
appellant.
The Utah case most often cited on the issue of summary
judgment is Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
Some of its progeny and their quotes which Appellant believes are
applicable to this case are the following:
ARGUMENT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE
It is the position of the Appellant that the pleading was of
such complexity that the litigation before the trial court was
never in a posture where summary judgment was a pro-remedy.
THE LAW
Summary judgment is provided by Rule 56 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Rule 56(c) provides:

"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."
l n W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627
P.2d 56 (Utah 1981), this court set forth Utah law on summary
judgmeri

le following language:

"Motions for summary judgment serve the salutary
purpose of eliminating the time and expense of a trial
when a party is entitled to relief on the law as
9

applied to undisputed facts. Brandt v. Springville
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960).
Because the remedy is preemptory, a court in
considering a motion for summary judgment must view the
facts and the inferences from those facts in the light
most favorable to the party moved against. Rich v.
McGovern. Utah, 551 P.2d 1266 (1976); Controlled
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d
807 (1966); Strand v. Mavne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d
396 (1963); Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P.2d
410 (1959). In all events, *[i]t is not the purpose of
the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the
weight of evidence, ' and * it only takes one sworn
statement under oath to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create an issue of
fact.1 Holbrook Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1975). Plaintiff has met that requirement in
this case.,f
In Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) our
Supreme Court said:
"Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In re Williams'
Estates,
10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d
683 (1960). If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the
court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable
inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Durham v. Margetts,
Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 (1977);
Thompson

v.

Ford

Motor

Co.,

16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62

(1964)."
Mountain States Etc. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1984):
"Therefore under Rule 56(c), Utah R.Civ.P., summary
judgment can be granted only if the record shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Doubts, uncertainties or inferences
concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to
10

the court before judgment can be rendered against them
unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court
that the party opposing judgment can establish no right
to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence
or assess credibility.11
Later cases have been to the same effect. In Rees v.
Albertson, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) our Supreme Court said:
"In consequence of the facts as contended by the
plaintiff and the principles of law applicable thereto
as discussed herein, it is our conclusion that the
summary judgment was improperly granted and that this
case should be remanded for further proceedings.11
Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., Utah, 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah
1980).

|

"It is a well-settled principle of law that summary
judgment can only be granted when there is no dispute
as to a material fact. Russell
v. Park City
Utah
Corp.,
29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973);
Controlled
Receivables,
Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d
807 (1966). The purpose of summary judgment is to save
the expense and time of the parties and the court, and
if the party being ruled against could not prevail when
the facts are looked at most favorably for his
position, the summary judgment should be granted.
Holbrook
Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191 (1975)."
In Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) this court said:
"On this appeal we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the losing party, Durham v.
Margetts,
Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 (1977); Tnorpson
v. Ford Motor
Co.,
16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964")."
The summary judgment in the instant case cannot be
sustained. The allegations, if proven, may support a
claim in negligence. Moreover, the record reveals
disputed issues of material facts."
W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Nat. Res. Co, Utah 627 P.2d 56 (Utah
1981).
"On a motion for summary judgment, it is not
appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evidence
11

concerning such factors, the sole inquiry to be
determined is whether there is a material issue of fact
to be decided. Holbrook
Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191
(Utah 1975). In making that determination, a court
should not evaluate the credibility of the witness. It
is of no moment that the evidence on one side may
appear to be strong or even compelling, and documentary
evidence is not dispositive if the intent and purpose
underlying the documents are at issue.
Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 122 (Utah 1986).
"Typically, factual disputes are raised by sworn
statements. See Holbrook
Cc. v. Adams, 54 2 P.2d 191
(Utah 1975). "
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990).
"In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary
judgment, we treat the statements and evidentiary
materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive
them as the only credible evidence, and we sustain the
judgment only if no issues of fact which could affect
the outcome can be discerned."
"[i]f there is any genuine issue as to any material
fact, summary judgment should be denied. To
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, it
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal
theory. Indeed, it only requires one sworn statement
to dispute the claims on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact. In resolving
the issue, the court does not judge the credibility of
the claims or the witnesses or the weight of the
evidence."
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995).
"In granting summary judgment, it is apparent that the
trial court gave more weight to some affidavits than to
others. This was inappropriate at this stage of the
litigation. On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole
inquiry should be whether material issues of fact
exist. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sonic Nat'1 Resources
Co,
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)."
"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to
12

resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when
upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the
party ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail. Holbrook
Co. v. Adams 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1975). We have additionally held that * it only takes
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments
on the other side of the controversy and create an
issue of fact.1
Id."
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App.
1996).
"The Utah Supreme Court recently pointed out that "[o]n
a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not
weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry should be
whether material issues of fact exist".
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to
resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to
eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial
when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by
the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to
prevail".
"Id. at 1101 (quoting Holbrook
Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Moreover, , r :r only takes
one

sworn statement under oatn to dispute tne averments on
the other side of tne controversy and create an issue
of fact'"
Id (quoting Holbrook,
(emphasis added)."

542 P.2d at 193)

"In the present case, the trial court found facts and
weighed evidence presented by the parties, which was
inappropriate in considering a motion for summary
judgment."
The question is whether or not the record reveals, through
pleadings, affidavits and records in the case, a material dispute
of fact.

Here it does.

13

THE FACTS
The record reveals that at the time of the hearing on the
Motion for Summary Judgment there was before the court an
affidavit that swore there was an express oral contract which
rejected an "at-will" employment relationship.

Record 95, 96.

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
Only a full-blown hearing at which parties can develop the
various theories will show the pertinent and relevant facts that
obviously are involved, and Appellant has a right to a jury trial
on those issues pursuant to the jury instructions in the Addendum
hereto.
10.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
There are questions of fact as to whether Appellant was an

"at will" employee and whether Appellee was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law that render the granting of the subject Motion
for Summary Judgment invalid and contrary to law.

Said judgment

should be overruled and the case be remanded to the trial court
for trial and disposition.
Respectfully submitted this

"

day of March, 1999.

Robert B. Hansen, Pro Se
838 18r Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
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